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A ‘Cold War European’? Helmut
Schmidt and European integration,
c.1945–1982
Mathias Haeussler
Robinson College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
While Helmut Schmidt has often been depicted as a ‘reluctant European’ who
only came to embrace European integration because of US policy under Carter,
this article shows that Schmidt’s conceptions of Europe have remained largely
consistent since the late 1940s. Using rare materials from his private archive, it
analyses how Schmidt utilised the EC in dealing with the multiple crises of the
1970s, regarding European and transatlantic cooperation not as antagonistic but
as complementary processes. With the reheating of the Cold War from the late
1970s onwards, however, the international and domestic preconditions of
Schmidt’s two-pillar foreign policy gradually began to erode.
Introduction
Schmidt . . . is certainly not likely to push the Federal Government in the direction
of a more forwardWestern European policy. . . . He is not so much anti-European as
agnostic about it. He is sceptical about the Community’s ability to provide solutions
for the immediate problems confronting Europe. He has an almost Prussian
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intolerance of its inefficiency and financial lackadaisicalness. His general aim will be
to limit damage rather than to construct.1
This quotation from the British Foreign Office shortly before Helmut Schmidt was
elected German chancellor on 16 May 1974 is a good example of how Schmidt was
widely perceived as being reluctant and half-hearted towards European integration at
that time, only slowly coming to embrace its virtues during the later stages of his
chancellorship. ‘Brought up Anglophile, emerged Americanophile, turned into
Francophile’, the British weekly The Economist judged in 1979, and such perceptions
have since become embedded in the emerging historiography.2 For the historian
Wilfried Loth, Schmidt’s early political career had been dominated by the transatlantic
security relationship and national concerns in financial and economic matters; he also
suggests that Schmidt’s European policy was ‘steered towards a Community that only
worked insofar as it served the mutual interests of France and Germany’.3 Matthias
Schulz similarly paints the picture of a reluctant European who only came to support
the integration process because of an alleged lack of American leadership under
President Jimmy Carter after 1977.4 In Schulz’s eyes, Schmidt ‘considered the
European option only when the U.S. failed to respond to his initiatives, but after
several setbacks gained the conviction that Europe had to be strengthened on the basis
of Franco-German cooperation’.5 Most investigations of Schmidt’s European policies
correspondingly focus on the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) in
1978–9, often depicted as a radical departure from Schmidt’s earlier convictions and
triggered primarily by the dollar’s instability.6 Such analyses tie in neatly with a wealth
1 The National Archives, Public Record Office (Kew) [henceforward: TNA: PRO/] FCO33/2459,
‘Diplomatic Report 184/74: Germany, Europe and the United States’, 27 February 1974.
2The Economist, 29 September 1979.
3W. Loth, ‘Deutsche Europapolitik von Helmut Schmidt bis Helmut Kohl’, in Aufbruch zum Europa
der zweiten Generation: Die europa¨ische Einigung 1969–1984, ed. F. Knipping and M. Scho¨nwald (Trier:
Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2006), 475.
4M. Schulz, ‘Vom ”Atlantiker“ zum ”Europa¨er“? Helmut Schmidt, deutsche Interessen und die
europa¨ische Einigung’, inDie Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die europa¨ische Einigung 1949–2000: Politische
Akteure, gesellschaftliche Kra¨fte und internatinale Erfahrungen, ed. M. Ko¨nig und M. Schulz (Stuttgart: Franz
Steiner, 2004), 202–3. More nuanced is M. Schulz, ‘The Reluctant European: Helmut Schmidt, the European
Community, and Transatlantic Relations’, in The Strained Alliance: US-European Relations from Nixon to
Carter, ed. M. Schulz and T.A. Schwartz (Cambridge: University Press, 2010), 279–306.
5M. Schulz, ‘Review of ‘The Atlantic Community Unravelling? States, Protest Movements, and the
Transformation of US-European Relations, 1969–1983’, H-Soz-u-Kult, H-Net Reviews. November 2004
[http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id¼28225 accessed on 2 January 2014].
6 G. Thiemeyer, ‘Helmut Schmidt und die Gru¨ndung des Europa¨ischen Wa¨hrungssystems 1973–1979’,
in Europa der zweiten Generation, ed. Knipping and Scho¨nwald, 245–68; P. Ludlow, The Making of the
European Monetary System (London: Butterworth Scientific, 1982); H. Soell, Helmut Schmidt: 1969 bis
heute: Macht und Verantwortung (Mu¨nchen: DVA, 2008), 358–414; 691–708. By contrast, most writings
on Franco-German relations are more balanced: M. Weinachter, Vale´ry Giscard d’Estaing et l’Allemagne: Le
double reˆve inacheve´ (Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 2004); H. Miard-Delacroix, Partenaires de choix? Le
chancellier Helmut Schmidt et la France, 1974–82 (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1993); M. Waechter, Helmut
Schmidt und Vale´ry Giscard d’Estaing: Auf der Suche nach Stabilita¨t der Krise der 70er Jahre (Bremen:
Edition Temmen, 2011).
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of literature depicting the 1970s as a decade of ‘Eurosclerosis’ and transatlantic
tensions.7
By contrast, this article argues that Schmidt’s concepts of Europe have actually
remained remarkably consistent since the 1940s. They were grounded in the overriding
principle that European integration ultimately served Germany’s self-interest, and
displayed at least three distinctive features: first, the preference for pragmatic
piecemeal integration in clearly defined areas resulting from Schmidt’s awareness of
the growing economic interdependencies in the post-war world; second, an
internationalist conviction based on the need to bind post-war Germany firmly and
permanently into multilateral Western alliances; and, finally, the attempt to constantly
balance Germany’s relations with France and the United States. Thus, the article rejects
the notion that Schmidt somehow converted from being an ‘Atlanticist’ into being a
‘European’, showing instead how both relationships remained two equally
indispensable pillars of his foreign policy throughout the Cold War. Depicting
Schmidt as part of a particular generation that rose to power in the late 1960s and
1970s, it shows how these leaders embraced European integration primarily because it
served the national interests of their nations,8 and how they consciously sought to
adjust the EC to the new challenges of the 1970s. In so doing, the article not only adds
to a growing historiography that describes the 1970s as a period of European progress
and reform, rather than as one riddled by stagnation and widespread ‘Eurosclerosis’,9
but it also reveals the many interconnections of European integration and the Cold
War more generally.10
Early thoughts on Europe in the 1940s and 1950s
Born on 23 December 1918, Helmut Schmidt had never experienced democratic rule
as an adult before 1945; straight after his Abitur, he was drafted and remained a soldier
throughout the war. Whereas the Social Democratic Party’s (SPD’s) leading figures,
above all the charismatic and dominating party leader Kurt Schumacher, were first and
foremost political children of Weimar Germany, Schmidt was part of a new generation
7K. Wiegrefe,Das Zerwu¨rfnis. Helmut Schmidt, Jimmy Carter und die Krise der deutsch-amerikanischen
Beziehungen (Berlin: Propyla¨en Verlag, 2005); D. Dinan, Europe Recast: A History of European Union
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 125–66; T. Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945
(London: Vintage Books, 2005), 453–83.
8 Bearing striking similarities to more recent interpretations by A. Milward, The European Rescue of the
Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1999) and A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State
Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
9 A. Gfeller, Building a European Identity: France, the United States, and the Oil Shock, 1973–1974 (New
York: Berghahn, 2012); A. Romano, From De´tente in Europe to European De´tente: How the West Shaped the
Helsinki CSCE (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2009); R. Griffiths, ‘A Dismal Decade? European Integration in the
1970s’, in Origins and Evolution of the European Union, ed. D. Dinan (Oxford: University Press, 2006),
169–90.
10 N.P. Ludlow, ‘European integration and the Cold War’, in The Cambridge History of the Cold War,
Vol. II: Crises and De´tente, ed. M.P. Leffler and O.A. Westad (Cambridge: University Press, 2010), 179–97.
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that had been ‘exposed to the full force of Nazi ideology without possessing the
experience of previous political epochs to relativise what it was being told’.11
Though knowledge of a Jewish grandfather had made him largely immune to Nazi
propaganda,12 he nonetheless lacked an awareness of political alternatives, the
experience of Nazi Germany having instilled in him a profound scepticism of any
grand ideological schemes.13 These generational differences resulted in very different
attitudes towards Germany’s future within the SPD; and it was in this regard that the
young Schmidt opposed the official party line for the first time.
In the late 1940s, German political debate centred mainly on the future of the Ruhr,
the country’s industrial heartland. Throughout the occupation period, the Allies had
been at odds over the region’s future: whereas France had pressed for its complete
deindustrialisation to prevent a resurgent and possibly revanchist Germany, the
United States and the United Kingdom had recognised the importance of the Ruhr in
reviving a largely destroyed Germany in light of the emerging Communist and Soviet
threat to Western Europe.14 On 28 December 1948, the Allies decided to put the Ruhr
under external control, with its industrial output managed by an international
authority. Whereas the Christian Democrats (CDU) under Adenauer reluctantly
acquiesced to the scheme, the SPD heavily opposed it as a repressive tool constraining
the self-determination of the German people. Schumacher in particular believed that,
with Germany denied control of its industrial heartland, there would be little chance
for his vision of a unified, socialist, and self-determined Germany in the future.15
A volunteer in the First World War, Schumacher had aggressively opposed the rise of
the Nazis during the 1920s and 1930s, which had resulted in a 10-year imprisonment
in various concentration camps. Thus, he regarded the Allied victory not as defeat
but as liberation of the German people, believing that any future European order
would have to start with a unified, democratic Germany firmly embedded in a strong,
socialist Europe of self-determined and equal nation-states.16
The young Schmidt, by contrast, had very different ideas. In the SPD’s party
magazine of February 1949, he attacked Schumacher by claiming that the almost
universal condemnation of the Ruhrstatut in Germany was both ‘wrong and
11M. Roseman, ‘Generation Conflict and German history, 1770–1968’, in Generations in Conflict: Youth
Revolt and Generation Formation in Germany 1770–1968, ed. M. Roseman (Cambridge: University Press,
1995), 32.
12 H. Schmidt and F. Stern, Unser Jahrhundert: Ein Gespra¨ch (Mu¨nchen: Pantheon, 2011), 85.
13 For Schmidt’s experience of Nazi Germany, see H. Schmidt, ‘Politischer Ru¨ckblick auf eine
unpolitische Jugend’, in Kindheit und Jugend unter Hitler, ed. H. Schmidt and L. Schmidt (Berlin: Siedler,
1992), 213–54. For the intellectual foundations of his political thought, see M. Rupps, Helmut Schmidt:
Politikversta¨ndnis und geistige Grundlagen (Bonn: Bouvier, 1997).
14W. Loth, Der Weg nach Europa. Geschichte der europa¨ischen Integration 1939–1957 (Go¨ttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990), 35–39.
15 D. Rogosch, Vorstellungen von Europa: Europabilder in der SPD und bei den belgischen Sozialisten
1945–1957 (Hamburg: Reinhold Kra¨mer, 1996), 38; P. Merseburger, Der Schwierige Deutsche: Kurt
Schumacher (Stuttgart: DVA, 1995), 7.
16Merseburger, Schumacher, 7–8.
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dangerous’: ‘Wrong, because it only grasps at best half of the facts; dangerous, because
it may well compromise future possibilities for cooperation in Western Europe’. In his
eyes, the Ruhrstatut’s main virtue was that it satisfied France’s ‘legitimate security
needs’, which he thought had been the main obstacle to greater European cooperation
in previous years. Germany could only recover if Western Europe recovered as a whole,
for which he regarded French good-will a necessity.17 Already the year before, Schmidt
had warned in another article that the SPD’s nationalist stance over the Ruhr would
only isolate the party internationally,18 even forwarding his article to a British Labour
Party member to show ‘the English comrades that there are factors in the German
socialism which have other ideas than the official party line’. He reaffirmed that he
personally stood ‘strictly for the “international nationalisation”’ of the Ruhr, despite
having been ‘heavily attacked . . . by old German social-democrats because of my
“neglection [sic] of justified German claims”’.19
At the time, Schmidt’s beliefs were significantly shaped by his perceptions of
political developments in other countries, such as Scandinavia or Britain – as part of
his economics degree at Hamburg University, for example, he had written an extensive
essay on the nationalisation policies of the British Labour Party.20 In contrast to the
landlocked West Prussian Schumacher, Schmidt took great inspiration from his
hometown’s past as a major Hanseatic trading port, with his thirst for intellectual
inspiration soon translating into various initiatives for greater international
cooperation. In April 1948, as leader of the German Socialist Student Movement
(SDS), Schmidt organised an international conference of Socialist youth organisations
with 70 participants from 15 different countries where he bemoaned the ‘intellectual
isolation’ of his generation and put the conference under the motto ‘We young
German Socialists ask our friends from abroad to give us their opinions’.21
This internationalist outlook, which would remain a constant feature of Schmidt’s
politics, was intensified by his university studies, which illustrated to him the growing
interdependence of European and worldwide economies. Working at the Hamburg
Department of Foreign Trade afterwards, he also experienced the advantages of
European cooperation at first hand. In an official publication in 1950, for example,
Schmidt pleaded for greater cooperation between the sea ports of Northern Europe.
In light of their declining importance, he claimed that the ‘leading persons of all
parties concerned’ should prefer ‘a mutual agreement to the risk of a ruinous
competition’. Schmidt suggested ‘a cooperation and coordination of all the port
resources forming an organic part of the economic integration of all Europe as a
17H. Schmidt, ‘Das Ruhrstatut – drei Wochen spa¨ter’, in Der Sozialist: Mitteilungsblatt der
Landesorganisation Hamburg 4/2, 1 February 1949.
18 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Bonn), Helmut-Schmidt-Archiv [henceforward: 1/HSAA]005006, ‘Eine
Chance fu¨r Europa’, SDS Gruppe Hamburg: Rundbrief, June 1948.
19 1/HSAA005003, Schmidt to Eady, 28 June 1948.
20 Privates Archiv Helmut Schmidt (Hamburg), Eigene Arbeiten [henceforward: PHSA/EA], Band 1
1946–49, ‘Grundlinien der Sozialisierung in England’, 25 January 1947.
21 1/HSAA005004, ‘Conference Report’, 8–15 April 1948; ‘Barsbu¨ttel’, 19 May 1948.
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whole’ which he likened to the Schuman Plan.22 In several other articles, he similarly
argued that concrete proposals for economic cooperation served the unification of
Western Europe categorically better than any more grandiose schemes, musing
whether economists should not ultimately be seen as the better Europeans.23 Indeed,
such views were not dissimilar to those of Jean Monnet, who had also discovered the
political advantages of pooling economic resources and capacities during his stint at
the French Trade Ministry during the First World War.24
Clearly, then, the young Schmidtwas anything but agnostic or half-hearted towards the
European integration process in the late 1940s. Hewas also one of the few SPDpoliticians
who spoke out in favour of the Schuman Plan in May 1950, which was otherwise
supported only by a small minority of North German politicians in the party, such as
Bremen’s mayor Wilhelm Kaisen or the Hamburg mayor Max Brauer. Schumacher in
particular repeatedly attacked the French proposals as ‘conservative, capitalist, clerical,
and cartelistic’ because of their Rhinelandish flair and the predominantly Catholic,
centre-right politicians involved in their creation.25 Significantly, Schmidt later claimed
that he had been responsible for the economic analyses that had shaped Kaisen’s and
Brauer’s views during his time at the Hamburg Department of Foreign Trade.26 Yet, these
views never took hold of the SPD’s majority. At the decisive party convention in 1951,
only 11 delegates defied the party-line, with fourmore abstentions.27 It is noteworthy that
one of them was Schmidt’s fellow North German Willy Brandt, whose 12 years in
Scandinavian exile and subsequent political maturation in ColdWar Berlin had instilled
in him similarly strong internationalist convictions.28
Looking back, it seems that the late 1940s were a period in which Schmidt formed
many beliefs that would shape his European policies later: the preference for concrete
schemes for economic integration in particular areas; an internationalist outlook with
an awareness of other countries’ views and interests; as well as the conviction that post-
war Germany could only make its voice heard as part of a wider European community.
Indeed, these views were not unlike Konrad Adenauer’s at the time, who similarly
embraced European integration primarily for the concrete benefits it promised to
deliver to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) – a final end to Franco-German
hostilities and a safe multilateral environment for its political and economic
22H. Schmidt, ‘Hamburg and the Other North Sea Ports: Helmut Schmidt asks Leading Hamburg
persons about their opinion’, in Hamburg Department of Foreign Trade (Staatliches
Aussenhandelskontor), Hamburg Economic Studies (Hamburg, 1951), 3, 6.
23 See, for example, drafts in PHSA/EA, Band 3 – 1950–52, ‘Eine Neue Hansa? Zur Frage der
Zusammenarbeit der kontinentalen Nordseeha¨fen’, 5 December 1950; ‘Nordseeha¨fen und Integration der
europa¨ischen Wirtschaft’, undated.
24 A. Wilkens, ‘Einleitung’, in Interessen verbinden: Jean Monnet und die europa¨ische Integration der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ed. A. Wilkens (Bonn: Bouvier, 1999), 9.
25Merseburger, Schumacher, 464–8.
26 PHSA/EA, 21.6.-31.7.1978, ‘Toast’, 6 July 1978. No direct evidence from the 1950s could yet be found.
27Merseburger, Schumacher, 470.
28 A. Wilkens, ‘Willy Brandt und die europa¨ische Einigung’, in Deutschland und die europa¨ische
Einigung, ed. Ko¨nig und Schulz, 168–71.
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recovery.29 Yet Schmidt was also shaped by his generational experience, by his
essentially North German outlook on international affairs, as well as by his
understanding of economics. In contrast to Adenauer, for example, he had little time
for visions of a Christian bourgeois Europe uniting both Catholic and Protestant West
Germans against the Communist threat, instead being attracted to conceptions of a
bigger, outward-looking Europe that included the Scandinavian countries as well as
Britain.30 Such generational and regional differences were to become even more
pronounced in 1950s and 1960s Germany.
The makings of a “Cold War European”
During the 1950s, the Adenauer government exercised virtually a monopoly on
foreign policy in West Germany. With the Cold War curtain running directly through
German soil and in light of massive Soviet military superiority in conventional forces,
Adenauer’s policy of binding the FRG as closely as possible to the West
(‘Westbindung’) seemed like an obvious choice. The SPD’s policies for socialisation
and early German reunification, by contrast, seemed increasingly at odds with these
harsh geopolitical realities.31 Yet it was only after the disastrous 1957 general election
that the SPD officially moved away from socialist doctrines and committed itself to the
market economy, a crucial step from being a workers’ party to being a mass party.32 It
also began to conceptualise its foreign policy within the existing status quo in Europe;
developments that coincided with wider changes in the Cold War landscape.
In particular, whereas the American advantage in nuclear weapons had managed to
effectively deter Soviet attacks on Western Europe during the 1950s, the nuclear
stalemate that resulted from the USSR’s development of ‘second strike capabilities’
now led to questioning of the continuing value of this US strategic doctrine of massive
retaliation for European defence.33 As a result, the French President Charles de Gaulle
was the first to call for more European independence from the Americans. De Gaulle’s
vision was that of a cooperative pan-European system stretching from the Atlantic to
the Urals, based primarily on political cooperation with Germany and simultaneous
Franco-Soviet de´tente, which was meant to achieve ‘the greatest freedom of action for
29 For Adenauer, see H.P. Schwarz, ‘Adenauer und Europa’, Vierteljahreshefte fu¨r Zeitgeschichte 27
(1979), 471–523, and W. Loth, ‘Konrad Adenauer und die europa¨ische Einigung’, in Deutschland und die
europa¨ische Einigung, ed. Ko¨nig und Schulz, 39–60.
30 A. Doering-Manteuffel, ‘Rheinischer Katholik im Kalten Krieg. Das ”Christliche Europa“ in der
Weltsicht Konrad Adenauers’, in Die Christen und die Entstehung der Europa¨ischen Gemeinschaft, ed.
M. Greschat and W. Loth (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1994), 244.
31 D. Lehnert, Sozialdemokratie zwischen Protestbewegung und Regierungspartei, 1848–1983 (Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983), 177.
32 Ibid., 184.
33 D. Holloway, ‘Nuclear weapons and the escalation of the Cold War, 1945–1962’, in The Cambridge
History of the Cold War, Vol. 1: Origins, ed. M.P. Leffler, and O.A. Westad (Cambridge: University Press,
2010), 387.
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France and to maximise her world role’.34 This quest for a more independent role for
France came to dominate European politics throughout the 1960s, and it provoked a
variety of responses in West Germany.
Simply put, the German debate was fought between ‘Atlanticists’, who feared that
French behaviour jeopardised transatlantic relations and compromised the FRG’s
security, and ‘Gaullists’, who believed that a Franco-German axis at the heart of a more
independent European alliance was the best course to advance Germany’s national
interests.35 For example, the most outspoken proponent of ‘German Gaullism’ at that
time, the leading Bavarian politician Franz-Josef Strauß, wrote in a book he published
in 1966 that ‘the United States of Europe, with their own nuclear deterrent, must be in
a position to protect themselves in order to achieve an equal partnership with the
United States of America’.36 Again, regional identities were of paramount importance,
as most supporters of ‘German Gaullism’ could be found among South German
Catholics, such as Karl-Theodor von und zu Guttenberg or Heinrich Brentano.37
North German Protestants like Schmidt, by contrast, tended to place more emphasis
on the transatlantic relationship, as well as on forging closer links with Britain and the
Scandinavian countries. Schmidt in particular often juxtaposed his own regional
identity as a cosmopolitan Hamburg citizen against the Rhinelandish roots of
Adenauer’s conservatives, warning about the influence of the ‘Rhine-/Ruhr-clique’ and
describing Bonn as the FRG’s capital as a ‘sad joke’.38 In 1957, Schmidt even abstained
from voting on the Treaties of Rome in the German Bundestag because of British
absence;39 and in several newspaper articles in the 1950s and early 1960s, he warned
that any European scheme without the support of London would be a ‘death trap’ in
the long run – ‘Hitler also underestimated England’, one subheading read.40
There was an important geostrategic dimension to this, as Schmidt, the SPD’s
primary spokesman on security and defence in the late 1950s, strongly rejected the
view of German Gaullists that a nuclear-armed EC based on a Franco-German axis
would increase German security. Instead, he thought that such ideas grossly
overestimated the Western Europeans’ military strength. In his first book, he claimed
that the French force de frappe was based on ‘illusionary visions’ and had ‘no weight
whatsoever vis-a`-vis Moscow’; Britain would similarly be ‘as unable as all the other
West European countries to survive even the smallest nuclear strike, let alone be able to
34 G.H. Soutou, ‘The Linkage between European Integration and De´tente: the Contrasting Approaches
of de Gaulle and Pompidou, 1965 to 1974’, in European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-
Westpolitik, 1965–1973, ed. N.P. Ludlow (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 16, 12.
35 Though it is important to note that neither camp wanted to break ties with either the US or France
completely. See T. Geiger, Atlantiker gegen Gaullisten: Außenpolitischer Konflikt und innerparteilicher
Machtkampf in der CDU/CSU 1958–1969 (Mu¨nchen: Oldenbourg, 2008).
36 F.J. Strauss, Entwurf fu¨r Europa (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1966), 7.
37 Geiger, Atlantiker-Gaullisten, 48–64.
38Die Welt, 28 July 1962.
39 H. Schmidt, Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn: Menschen und Ma¨chte II (Berlin: Siedler, 1990), 102.
40 Echo, 2 April 1960; Echo, 9 April 1960.
8 M. Haeussler4324
carry out a retaliatory attack’.41 Any nuclear armament of the FRG was even more
unrealistic, as he put it in no uncertain terms to the SPD party convention in June
1966: ‘Germany will not become a nuclear power. The entire world situation clearly
stands against this. . . . There is no point in trying to avoid this basic fact.’42 Instead,
Schmidt thought that the West Europeans should devote their energies to counter the
massive Soviet superiority in conventional forces, thereby strengthening the European
pillar of NATO and trying to ensure a ‘balance of power’ on all military levels. John
F. Kennedy’s concept of an ‘Atlantic Community’, resting on both an American and a
European pillar, had much greater appeal to him.43 Again, his views were largely in line
with most other Social Democrats including Willy Brandt, who was similarly attracted
by the vision of a powerful Europe firmly embedded in a transatlantic framework.44
Nonetheless, Gaullist policies could not but illustrate the growing freedom of
manoeuvre for the West Europeans, as the corset of superpower confrontation slowly
eased over the divided continent.45 For the SPD, this offered an opportunity to design
and implement its Ostpolitik, departing from Adenauer’s policy of strict non-
recognition of the GDR and trying to foster a rapprochement with the GDR and
Eastern Europe by increasing political and economic contacts and creating
interdependencies. Though it is sometimes forgotten today, Schmidt was among its
earliest architects, having taken part in the drafting of the 1959 Deutschlandplan and
travelling extensively through Eastern Europe in the summer of 1966.46 Yet like
Brandt, he was also aware that Ostpolitik could only be successfully pursued with firm
backing from the Western alliance. As he put it in a speech to the annual IISS
conference in London in 1966, any German foreign policy had to ‘combine our
interests with those of our neighbours. We could be the more successful the more we
would be able to eliminate any fear of Germany’.47 France was of paramount
importance in this. ‘The future of our country depends to a considerable degree on a
minimum of understanding and friendship between Paris and Bonn’, he claimed to a
41H. Schmidt, Verteidigung oder Vergeltung: Ein deutscher Beitrag zum strategischen Problem der Nato
(Stuttgart: Seewald, 1961), 100; 102–3.
42 Vorstand der SPD, ed., Parteitag Dortmund 1966: Protokoll der Verhandlungen (Bonn: SPD, 1966),
454.
43 H. Schmidt, Strategie des Gleichgewichts: Deutsche Friedenspolitik und die Weltma¨chte (Stuttgart:
Seewald, 1969), 195; J.F. Kennedy, ‘Address at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, 4 July 1962’, The American
Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid¼8756 [accessed 20 July 2013].
44Wilkens, ‘Brandt und europa¨ische Einigung’, 174.
45 P. Villaume and O.A. Westad, ‘The Secrets of European De´tente’, in Perforating the Iron Curtain:
European De´tente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965–1985, ed. P. Villaume and O.A. Westad
(Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum, 2010), 7.
46 For the Deutschlandplan, see Schmidt’s drafts in 1/HSAA005020, 1959–60; W. Jarzabek, ‘Polish
Reactions to the West German Ostpolitik and East-West De´tente’, in Iron Curtain, ed. Villaume and
Westad, 38; D. Pick, Bru¨cken nach Osten: Helmut Schmidt und Polen (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 2012),
17–25.
47 1/HSAA005592, H. Schmidt, ‘Western Europe and Eastern Europe: The Changing Relationship’, IISS
8th Annual Conference, 2 October 1966.
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gathering of European socialist parties around the same time, as Germany simply
could not ‘afford Russo-French flirtations at the cost of Germany, especially not at the
cost of our position regarding Berlin and German unification’.48 During his time as
minister of defence (1969–72) and minister of finance (1972–74) under Brandt, he
thus reacted strongly whenever rumours of German neutralism surfaced. In February
1970, for example, he accused the British Daily Telegraph in an angry reader’s letter of
having ‘tried to construe a contrast between the eastern policy of the Federal Republic and
its membership in the Atlantic Alliance although the entire Cabinet has unanimously
emphasised that its eatern [sic] policy is being pursued on the basis of the Alliance.
Consequently, no differences of opinionwhatever, let alone a split does or did exist within
the Federal Cabinet’.49 Though thismaywell not have been thewhole truth, Schmidt’s line
was again in full accordance with that of Chancellor Brandt, who similarly went to great
lengths to counterbalance his Ostpolitik with a correspondingly proactiveWestpolitik.50
Clearly, then, Schmidt had come to appreciate how European integration provided
an important framework to advance German interests already in the 1960s. Again, his
multilateralist convictions were of paramount importance, as was his awareness of the
political power of economic interdependencies. In October 1974, less than six months
after his election as Chancellor, Schmidt therefore visited Brezhnev in Moscow,
opening up long-term prospects of economic cooperation and clearing the way for
substantial improvements in intra-German relations.51 He also played a crucial role in
the Conference of Security and Economic Cooperation in Europe, again trying to
increase trade links while strongly resisting pressures to legally cement the
inalterability of inner-European borders.52 As will be seen later, the long-term
consequences and ultimate incompatibility of these moves with American grand
strategy would come to haunt the Western alliance in the late 1970s.53
Schmidt’s European policy before Carter, 1974–76
At the time of his election as German Chancellor on 16 May 1974, however, Schmidt
was widely perceived as being half-hearted or even hostile towards European
integration. Such perceptions had only recently been fuelled by his clash with the
French foreign minister Michel Jobert at the Washington Energy Conference in
48 1/HSAA007903, ‘Notiz zur Amsterdamer Konferenz’, 16 January 1966.
49 1/HSAA005474, Schmidt to Daily Telegraph, 26 February 1970.
50 A. Wilkens, ‘New Ostpolitik and European Integration: Concepts and Policies in the Brandt Era’, in
Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, ed. Ludlow, 67–80.
51 O. Bange, ‘“Keeping De´tente Alive”: Inner-German Relations under Helmut Schmidt and Erich
Honecker, 1974–1982’, in The Crisis of De´tente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–1985, ed.
L. Nuti (London: Taylor and Francis, 2008), 231–2.
52 G. Niedhart, ‘Peaceful Change of Frontiers as a Crucial Element in the West German Strategy of
Transformation’, in Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe, ed. O. Bange and G. Niedhart (New
York: Berghahn, 2008), 45–9.
53 A. Romano, ‘The Main Task of European Political Cooperation: Fostering De´tente in Europe’, in
Perforating the Iron Curtain, ed. Villaume and Westad, 126.
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January 1974, where Schmidt, upset by France’s opposition to joint transatlantic
action, had claimed that ‘if he had to choose between the US and France, he would
choose the former’.54 Yet, though Jobert publicly castigated Schmidt’s alleged betrayal
of the European cause, Schmidt’s position was in fact completely in line with his long-
term vision of a two-pillar foreign policy of a united Western Europe firmly embedded
in a transatlantic framework. He spoke out not against a joint European position in
principle, but against French preferences for dealing with the oil-producing countries
unilaterally instead of devising a common approach.55 This became evident to
everybody once the election of Vale´ry Giscard d’Estaing as French president on 27 May
1974 triggered a marked change in French foreign policy, which offered Schmidt the
opportunity to conduct a proactive European policy right from the start of his
chancellorship.
To Schmidt, the most significant result of Giscard d’Estaing’s election was that, in
marked contrast to his predecessors, Giscard’s European commitment went ‘hand in
hand’ with a renewed emphasis on cooperation with the United States, an approach
that was strikingly similar to Schmidt’s own conceptions of transatlantic relations
since the 1950s.56 For Schmidt, who had already cooperated closely with Giscard
during their joint stint as finance ministers in 1972–74, this meant that a major
obstacle towards greater European integration had been removed, with neither
country defining its European commitment in opposition to the American
superpower any more. Already in June 1974, he therefore told US President Nixon
‘how pleased I am with the looming possibilities of closer Franco-German
cooperation in European and Atlantic matters’; in a letter to his old friend Henry
Kissinger, Nixon’s national security adviser, he similarly pointed out that Giscard
seemed ready for US-European cooperation as two equal partners.57 The almost
simultaneous replacement of Edward Heath by the more transatlantic-minded Harold
Wilson as British prime minister, as well as Nixon’s succession by Gerald Ford in
August 1974, further added to this new climate of transatlantic harmony and
benevolence. ‘You know, it’s sick’, Kissinger remarked in private conversation with
Ford as early as September 1975, ‘There has been a revolution in our relations with
France . . . our relations with Europe have never been better’.58 Thus, the early years of
Schmidt’s chancellorship saw a ‘moment of striking transatlantic cooperation’ that
54 TNA: PRO/FCO33/2459, ‘Diplomatic report: Germany, Europe, and the United States’, 27 February
1974.
55 F. Hilfrich, ‘West Germany’s Long Year of Europe: Bonn between Europe and the United States’, in
Strained Alliance, ed. Schulz, 237–56; G. Mu¨ller, ‘Folgen der O¨lkrise fu¨r den europa¨ischen
Einigungsprozeß nach 1973’, in Europa der zweiten Generation, ed. Knipping and Scho¨nwald, 73–93.
56 Gfeller, European Identity, 199.
57 1/HSAA006579, Schmidt to Nixon, 4 June 1974; Schmidt to Kissinger, June 1974.
58 Gerald R. Ford Library (Ann Arbor, MI), National Security Adviser: Memoranda of Conversations,
1973–1977, Box 15, ‘Memorandum of Conversation Ford, Scowcroft, Kissinger’, 27 September 1975.
http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553247.pdf [accessed 27 June 2014].
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contrasted starkly with the ‘much more problematic periods’ before and after Ford’s
presidency.59
It was primarily this benevolent external environment that enabled Schmidt to
utilise the European Community in what he regarded as his most important
international task, namely to counteract the consequences of the world economic
crisis, which he believed could only be solved through international cooperation.60
Though most studies thus far have centred on Schmidt’s role on the global level, such
as in the creation of the world economic summits,61 the coordination of European
economies, which suffered from quite different fates in early 1974, lay at the core of
Schmidt’s wider strategy. For example, whereas German inflation was comparatively
modest at 7.2%, the situation was significantly worse in France (12.0%), Britain
(13.2%), and Italy (14.2%).62 As Schmidt attributed these trends largely to different
national economic and fiscal policies, often pursued with little regard for their wider
international ramifications, he considered it pivotal to use the EC framework to
achieve a common economic course based on fiscal restraint and budgetary
consolidation. While he regarded any effort at concerted international action as
‘pointless’ without ‘the de-facto leadership by the United States and without the
involvement of Japan’, Schmidt wrote in an internal memorandum to Brandt and
Wehner, the possible success of any scheme would ‘remain fragmentary without the
involvement of the European Community as a whole’.63 Again, Schmidt found an
eager partner for this economic course in Giscard, who quickly embarked upon a
stability-orientated fiscal policy in France, despite the many constraints he was facing
from Gaullists and Socialists alike.64 Apart from the economic logic behind
coordinating the EC’s two biggest economies, such joint progress within a multilateral
framework also seemed necessary to Schmidt in order to counteract any impressions
of German dominance in the economic field. On German television in July 1975, for
example, he warned that Germany should ‘only give gentle advice. If we give advice too
loud someone comes and says that we want to behave like Wilhelm II’. A few years
later, he put it even more bluntly: ‘The greater the relative success of Germany, the
longer the memory of Auschwitz will last’.65
59 N.P. Ludlow, ‘The Real Years of Europe?: US–West European Relations during the Ford
Administration’, Journal of Cold War Studies 15/3 (2013), 136.
60 For the wealth of literature on the multiple crises of the 1970s, see as a starting point N. Ferguson
et al., eds., The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press, 2010).
61 E. Mourlon-Druol, ‘Managing from the top: Globalisation and the rise of summitry, mid-1970s/early
1980s’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 23/4 (2012), 679–703; J. von Karczewski, “Weltwirtschaft ist unser
Schicksal”: Helmut Schmidt und die Schaffung der Weltwirtschaftsgipfel (Bonn: Dietz, 2008).
62 1/HSAA010072, ‘Memorandum’, 7 May 1974.
63 1/HSAA010071, Schmidt to Brandt and Wehner, 14 April 1974.
64 H. Simonian, The Privileged Partnership: Franco-German Relations in the European Community,
1969–1984 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 247–55.
65 TNA:PRO/PREM16/427, Bonn to FCO, 16 July 1975; The Economist, 29 September 1979.
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Thus, Schmidt’s early preference for pragmatic, piecemeal cooperation over more
ambitious schemes of European integration is again clearly detectible, since he
regarded the essentially intergovernmental coordination of European economic
policies as the EC’s most urgent task. As he explained in a major speech to the Foreign
Affairs Club in February 1976: ‘If for instance we put the pro capita gross domestic
product in Germany at 100, the figure for the nine countries of the Community in
1974 range between 100 on the one hand and 35 only in the ninth country. . . . These
figures reflect differences in inflation rates, not only that, and hence in exchange rates
but also in standards of living, in productivity, in the degree of industrial
modernisation, in infrastructures and in social structures’. Consequently, the
Community could not ‘overnight, by those “qualitative leaps” which one hears
mentioned so often, develop into an all-embracing European union. Each stage of
integration must stand the test in that the people in our countries are willing to
endorse it, to support it, because it holds advantages for them and opens up prospects
for a better future’. It was important that there was ‘a realisation that the nations of
Europe are better off on a common course as far as the economy is concerned, and
certainly as regards security and peace’.66
These convictions in turn shaped Schmidt’s attitudes towards the EC’s institutions,
which have often received criticism from contemporaries and historians alike.67 After
all, the most important result of Schmidt’s early European policy was the
institutionalisation of regular meetings between EC heads of government in the
form of European Council, organised strictly along intergovernmental lines.68 It is not
without some justification, then, that historians like Wilfried Loth criticise the
‘institutional abstinence’ in Schmidt’s European policy.69 Yet, Schmidt believed that
only an intergovernmental forum could offer decisive leadership at a time when
economic and fiscal policies were still firmly in the hands of national governments.
He therefore regarded the European Council as a necessary element in the EC’s reform
and revitalisation. ‘Let us not waste time on sterile philosophical disputes about a
federal or a confederated Europe’, he claimed in his Foreign Affairs Club speech, ‘and
also let us not rouse expectations which cannot be fulfilled’.70 That he was not alone in
this belief is evident not least in the fact that such regular meetings of European heads
of government had first been suggested by Willy Brandt, Georges Pompidou and
Edward Heath, none of whom can be suspected for a lack of conviction to the
European cause.71
66 Bundespresseamt [henceforward: BPA], ‘Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in London’, 6 February 1976.
[copy in PHSA/EA, 29.1.-12.3.1976].
67 See, for example, the parliamentary debate on Europe in Protokolle des Deutschen Bundestages, 7.
Wahlperiode, 235. Sitzung, 8 April 1976, 16369, 16371.
68 E. Mourlon-Druol, ‘Filling the EEC Leadership Vacuum? The Creation of the European Council in
1974’, Cold War History 10/3 (2010), 315–39.
69 Loth, ‘Deutsche Europapolitik’, 480
70 BPA, ‘Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in London’, 6 February 1976. [copy in PHSA/EA, 29.1.-12.3.1976].
71Wilkens, ‘Brandt und europa¨ische Einigung’, 183.
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The European Monetary System and the changing context of the transatlantic
partnership, 1977–78
Hence, Schmidt’s European policy from 1974 to 1976 reflected many characteristics of
his earlier political thought, for example his awareness of the interdependence of
European economies, or the preference for piecemeal cooperation in clearly defined
areas. Yet, the decisive precondition for Schmidt’s early European policies to flourish
was the benevolent and cooperative transatlantic relationship under US President
Gerald Ford. With the election of Jimmy Carter in January 1977, however, the nature
of US-West European cooperation changed profoundly, as American Cold War
strategy gradually began to shift towards a more confrontational stance vis-a`-vis the
Soviets.72 While any departure from de´tente was always likely to antagonise the Federal
Republic, the transatlantic climate under Carter was further worsened by severe
diplomatic fallouts, for example over nuclear proliferation or the neutron bomb.73
When rumours over a new European currency scheme proposed by Schmidt then
leaked to the press in April 1978, merely a week after Carter’s decision to delay
production of the neutron bomb had become public; most commentators quickly
interpreted the move as an assertion of greater European autonomy from the United
States. The German weekly Der Spiegel, for example, talked about a conscious
‘decoupling’ of Europe from the US in the monetary field, asserting that Schmidt now
believed that ‘Europe should cut its own path in fiscal policy’.74 Indeed, these
interpretations have since become mirrored in some of the historiography on
Schmidt’s European policy.75 Embedding the EMS’s genesis in the wider evolution of
Schmidt’s thought, however, reveals a striking sense of continuity: though the scheme
was consciously presented as a radical and innovative break from previous policies at
the time, its technical mechanisms as well as the underlying motivations behind it,
were almost entirely in accordance with Schmidt’s previous convictions.76
To be sure, some of the motivations behind the EMS could undoubtedly be found in
the dollar’s chronic instability. While this had been a recurrent feature of the
international monetary system since the abolition of fixed exchange rates in the early
1970s, the Carter administration’s economic and fiscal policies had drastically
72 O. Njolstad, ‘The Collapse of Superpower De´tente, 1975–1980’, in The Cambridge History of the Cold
War, Vol. III: Endings, ed. M. P. Leffler and O.A. Westad (Cambridge: University Press, 2010), 135–55; R. L.
Garthoff, De´tente and confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC,
1994).
73Wiegrefe, Das Zerwu¨rfnis, in general; for the neutron bomb, K. Spohr, ‘Germany and the Politics of
the Neutron Bomb, 1975–1979’, Diplomacy&Statecraft 21/2 (2010), 259–85.
74Der Spiegel, 10 April 1978.
75M. E. Guasconi, ‘Europe and the EMS challenge: Old and New Forms of European Integration in the
1970s’, in Crisis of De´tente, ed. Nuti, 177–89; Loth, ‘Deutsche Europapolitik’, 477. M. Schulz, ‘Reluctant
European’, 303.
76 The most recent study is E. Mourlon-Druol, A Europe Made of Money: The Emergence of the European
Monetary System (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012); for a tighter focus on Schmidt, see
Thiemeyer, ‘Schmidt und die Gru¨ndung des Europa¨ischen Wa¨hrungssystems’, 245–68.
14 M. Haeussler4380
worsened the situation in the eyes of the Europeans. Already in January 1978, Schmidt
therefore highlighted the consequences of the dollar’s instability in the German
Bundestag, illustrating how the dollar’s weakness also impacted on European currency
exchange rates and threatened intra-EC trade.77 Thus, one prime motivation of the
EMS was to offer European economies greater protection from such external currency
fluctuations by tying its currencies permanently together within an agreed band of
2.25%. In July 1978, this was also how Schmidt introduced the scheme at the Bonn
world economic summit. There was ‘virtually no German company that is not on edge
because part of its production is being sold at changing price levels or because it
cannot make adequate profit estimates’, Schmidt declared. Since the ‘German- French
border’ was ‘not an economic border’ and the EC had made ‘our companies
dependent on one another’, the EMS was needed to protect European economies
against the drastic external currency fluctuations at the time.78 In so doing, it would
also protect Schmidt’s economic agenda of fostering stability-driven economic policies
of key EC economies, something he had pursued since the earliest days of his
chancellorship. As he claimed in an interview with the Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung in July
1978, there was the risk of ‘a setback in the coordination of our economic policies
within the EC if we did not eliminate the disruptive factor of fluctuating exchange
rates as far as possible’.79
Thus, though triggered by the dollar’s instability, the EMSwas essentially a defensive
attempt to protect the substance of the economic policies Schmidt had been trying to
push through since 1974. Neither was there much originality in the technical aspects of
the EMS, as Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol has recently suggested. It did not include a
European Monetary Fund, any automatic obligations for stronger currencies to
intervene, or any significant transfer of financial resources to weaker member-states,
thereby making its concrete mechanisms in fact ‘almost identical’ to the European
currency snake of the early 1970s.80 There is also no reliable evidence that the EMS was
deliberately directed against the dollar. Indeed, Schmidt believed that greater currency
stability in Europe would not undermine but strengthen the transatlantic alliance by
stabilising its European pillar, insisting in an interviewwith theWashington Post that the
EMS had absolutely nothing to dowith any allegedwish to replace the dollar as a reserve
currency.81 Significantly, Schmidt’s views were shared by most people in the Carter
administration. A major US intelligence assessment, for example, concluded that the
EMS was primarily driven by ‘the frustrations that West European leaders are facing in
their inherently difficult task of developing the coordinated economic policies needed
to go along with the region’s high degree of economic integration’. With each country
77 Bulletin, 20 January 1978.
78 Jimmy-Carter-Library (Atlanta) [henceforward JCL], NLC-19-25-9-1-4, ‘Record of Bonn Summit’,
16 July 1978.
79 Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung, 14 July 1978.
80Mourlon-Druol, Europe Made of Money, 258, 250–7.
81 PHSA/EA, 17.4.-17.5.1978, ‘Transcript of interview with Washington Post’, 18 April 1978.
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still pursuing largely independent fiscal and monetary policies, Schmidt ‘probably’
viewed ‘his plan as a way to force “stabilisation” measures within Europe as a condition
for German assistance on exchange rates’.82 Carter’s chief economic adviser Henry
Owen similarly briefed the president that ‘we view the EMS as an important step toward
European integration, whichwe have long supported, and that we trust EMSwill evolve
in ways that will strengthen the global monetary system, world growth, and the IMF’s
role’.83 This seems to have been largely in line with Carter’s personal attitude. ‘Our
policy is to encourage the EC and its cohesiveness in political and economicmatters’, he
claimed at the Bonn economic summit, ‘we assume no adverse intention regarding the
dollar, and I doubt that there is any toward the dollar’.84
Quite apart from contemporary portrayals, then, the EMS was not a radical
departure from previous convictions on behalf of Schmidt, but it was essentially a
defensive move designed to protect the achievements of his European policies in
previous years. Neither was it directly targeted against the dollar’s leadership role in the
international system, or even designed to undermine the transatlantic alliance from
within. In one of his major interviews at the time, Schmidt in fact defended himself
openly against such accusations of having turned from an ‘Atlanticist’ into being a
‘Europeanist’, again drawing on John F. Kennedy’s ‘Atlantic Community’: ‘I have never
seen these two as alternatives, but I have always regarded them not only as reconcilable,
but as mutually reinforcing’.85 The very fact that the EMSwas commonly perceived as a
sign of greater European autonomy at the time, however, already foreshadows some of
the difficulties Schmidt would have to face in trying to reconcile the increasingly
diverging American and European interests during his final years as chancellor.
The reheating of the Cold War and the disintegration of Schmidt’s two-pillar
foreign policy, 1977–82
Though the FRG’s Ostpolitik had largely complemented and coincided with American
de´tente policy in the late 1960s, their objectives had never been fully compatible from
the start. Whereas US strategy had aimed primarily at preserving and consolidating
the status quo in superpower relations, Ostpolitik had at least partially been based on
the assumption that the creation of long-term political linkages and economic
interdependencies might gradually lead to internal transformations from within
Eastern Europe.86 As a result of the Carter administration’s increasingly confrontational
approach towards the Soviet Union after 1977, these underlying conceptual differences
82 JCL, NLC-49-2-11-5-9, ‘West European Monetary Initiatives: Signal to the US?: An Intelligence
Assessment’, 2 June 1978.
83 JCL, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 4, Owen to President, 12
December 1978.
84 JCL, NLC-19-25-9-1-4, ‘Record of Bonn Summit’, 16 July 1978.
85Die Welt, 14 July 1978.
86 John W. Young, ‘Western Europe and the end of the Cold War, 1979–1989’, in Cambridge History of
the Cold War, Vol. III: Endings, ed. Leffler and Westad, 291–4.
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now burst into the open. In light of this, Schmidt’s final years in office saw repeated and
sustained attempts by the German chancellor to reconcile the increasingly divergent
interests among the transatlantic alliance: while desperately shoring up European
support forNATO’s double-track decision, hewas simultaneously trying to preserve the
many political and economic advantages the Europeans had gained from de´tente.
The ultimate failure of Schmidt’s delicate balancing act would contribute heavily to his
ousting from office in October 1982.
In fact, the most significant strategic decision of the Western bloc during the final
years of Schmidt’s chancellorship serves as a powerful example of Schmidt’s personal
attachment to the transatlantic alliance. Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s,
superpower de´tente policies, aimed at achieving approximate parity on all military
levels, had also helped stabilise European security. From the mid-1970s onwards,
however, the Soviet Union’s deployment of intermediate-range nuclear ballistic
missiles, the so-called SS-20s, severely threatened to upset this strategic balance in
Europe: not only were these missiles excluded from all ongoing arms control
negotiations, but NATO also lacked adequate counter-weapons to serve as effective
strategic deterrents.87 With major West German cities being among the SS-20s’ most
likely targets, Schmidt decided to publicly draw attention to the emerging strategic
imbalance, calling for an adequate Western response to the Soviet build-up during a
well-publicised speech in October 1977.88 In due course, his call would result in
NATO’s infamous ‘double-track’ decision to modernise its intermediate-range nuclear
weapons while at simultaneously offering arms control negotiations to the Soviets.
This decision, in whose genesis Schmidt played a vital part, in fact ‘bore all the
hallmarks of his political thought’: it remedied the potential military imbalance while
also keeping open channels of communication to the Soviet Union.89 More generally,
it was also a powerful demonstration of transatlantic unity and resolution in light of
adverse domestic and international circumstances; even though one for which
Schmidt eventually would have to pay a heavy price.
By contrast, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 triggered more
irreconcilable transatlantic rifts. Whereas the Carter administration called for tough
economic sanctions in order to contain future Soviet aggression, West European
leaders like Schmidt were anxious to refrain from such drastic measures in order to
deescalate tensions and allow the Soviets to save face. Both political and economic
pressures put the Western Europeans at odds with American grand strategy. With
87 For a broad survey of the genesis of NATO’s dual track decision, see L. Nuti, ‘The Origins of the 1979
Dual Track Decision – a Survey’, in Crisis of De´tente, 57–71. More detailed, in particular with regard to
Western Europe, is K. Spohr, ‘Conflict and Cooperation in Intra-Alliance Nuclear Politics: Western Europe,
the United States, and the Genesis of NATO’s Dual-Track Decision, 1977–1979’, Journal of Cold War
Studies, 13/2 (Spring 2011), 39–89.
88 H. Schmidt, ‘The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture’, Survival, xx/1, (1978), 2–10.
89 Spohr, ‘Conflict and Cooperation’, 43. See also K. Spohr, ‘Helmut Schmidt and the Shaping of
Western Security in the Late 1970s: the Guadeloupe Summit of 1979’, The International History Review 37,
no. 1 (January 2015), 167–92.
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regard to the economic sphere, the many trade links that had emerged since the late
1960s between Western and Eastern Europe meant that the Europeans simply had
more to lose from economic sanctions: in the early 1980s, West European trade with
the Soviets amounted to $41 billion, compared to a total of only $2.5 billion in US-
Soviet trade.90 They also feared that a reheating of superpower tensions would threaten
the continent’s military security, causing alarm in all West European capitals. Indeed,
while the FRG, given its role as NATO’s ColdWar frontline and unique vulnerability over
Berlin and intra-German relations, was particularly anxious to ensure that the
achievements of de´tente ‘should not be called into question’, most other West European
countries followed suit.91 As Carter’s National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski
bemoaned, ‘the Allies have, in effect, done nothing in their bilateral relations with the
Soviets to show their displeasure and concern over the invasion of Afghanistan’. In fact,
by reluctantly supporting the boycott of the Moscow Olympics in 1980, the FRG had
actually fulfilled more US demands than other major allies, such as Britain or France.
‘No other European will do more than Schmidt’, Brzezinski grudgingly admitted, ‘and
most will do less’.92 These events were mirrored in the Western response to the Polish
crisis of 1981–2, where the West Europeans were similarly united in their refusal to
follow the new US president Ronald Reagan’s call for economic sanctions.93 Indeed, over
the delicate question of the Siberian Gas Pipeline, even Margaret Thatcher sided
unreservedly with the West Europeans.94 Rather than interpreting Schmidt’s vocal
discontent over US Cold War strategy under Carter and Reagan as a significant change
from his earlier political beliefs, then, it may more convincingly be seen merely as the
reflection of a wider irreconcilability between Western European and American Cold
War strategies which came to the open in the late 1970s.
During his final years in office, Schmidt increasingly sought to reconcile the
irreconcilable, trying to reaffirm Western Europe’s commitment to the transatlantic
alliance while also protecting its different political and economic interests during a phase
of renewed superpower conflict. Throughout 1981 and 1982, he therefore repeatedly
stressed his strong personal commitment to the transatlantic alliance in public. ‘Themost
important factor contributing to stability is and remains the partnership between
Europeans and Americans’, he wrote in Foreign Affairs in 1981, regarding ‘this historic
partnership’ as ‘a constant of our policy. Our basic foreign policy orientation is not
negotiable.OurAmerican andourEuropean friends aswell as ourpartners theworld over
90 A. Romano, ‘Fostering De´tente in Europe’, 137. On economic interdependencies, see W.D. Lippert, The
Economic Diplomacy of Ostpolitik: Origins of NATO’s Energy Dilemma (Oxford: Berghahn, 2011), 173–82.
91 Bundesarchiv (Koblenz), Bundeskanzleramt [henceforward: B136/]17114, ‘Sowjetische Invasion in
Afghanistan und ihre Auswirkungen auf das Ost-West-Verha¨ltnis’, 21 February 1980.
92 JCL, NLC-17-131-4-2-2, Brzezinski to President, 18 March 1980.
93 G.F. Domber, ‘Transatlantic Relations, Human Rights, and Power Politics’, in Iron Curtain, ed.
Villaume and Westad, 197; Pick, Schmidt und Polen, 109–115.
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can depend on it.’95 At this point, however, Schmidt’s political capital was already
diminishing, since he now faced virulent opposition not only from his own party, with
key figures like Egon Bahr or Willy Brandt speaking out against the NATO double-track
decision, but also from a growing peace movement which united a variety of protest
groups under an oftendiffuse banner of anti-Americanism.96 These domestic pressures in
turnwere beginning to severely constrain his influence abroad. In early 1981, for example,
US Secretary of State Al Haig told the new American president Reagan how Schmidt
wanted ‘to assure you in the strongest possible terms that the FRG would stand firmly
behind the decision to station Pershing and cruise missiles in Germany “no matter how
much the far leftmight yell”. But he alsomade vividly clear that it would be impossible for
him politically to stand behindmodernisation if the U.S. failed to pursue negotiations on
limiting TNF deployments with the Soviets’.97 Yet, the Reagan administration was
beginning to lose patience with Western European sensibilities. Next to Haig’s
memorandum, onemember of the National Security Council noted in handwriting how
it was ‘not our job to keep Schmidt in power – or any of the others. . . . STATE is too
concerned on saving European governments and lets that become overriding concern in
setting US policy. . . . Someone at State misses fact trend in Europe is to the right.
Alternative, in case of Germany, is not Willy Brandt or anyone like him!’98
In the end, this harsh assessment was vindicated by events. On 1 October 1982,
Schmidt lost a vote of confidence in the German Bundestag which forced the
dissolution of his government and succession by the CDU leader Helmut Kohl as
Chancellor. At this stage, the international and the domestic foundations on which
Schmidt had previously built his foreign policy had been all but eroded. With Giscard
and Callaghan already out of office, Schmidt seemed like the last man standing of a
de´tente generation of European politicians, increasingly short of international and
domestic support. Yet Schmidt’s continuing attachment to a strong Europe firmly
embedded in the transatlantic alliance remained constant even after his fall from office,
evident not least in a book he published in 1985. ‘National strategies are anachronistic
in our present-day world’, Schmidt wrote. ‘Given the economic, political, and security
interdependence of the Western world, neither the medium-size powers like Japan,
France, Britain, Germany, Italy, and Canada, nor even the super-sized United States
itself, can by their own national means alone achieve their economic goals, their
95H. Schmidt, ‘A Policy of Reliable Partnership’, Foreign Affairs 59/4 (Spring 1981), 744. For numerous
other examples, see Frankfurter Rundschau, 30 June 1981; PHSA/EA, 17.1.-21.2.1980, ‘Off-The-Record
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political goals, or their external security’. What was required was therefore a ‘grand
strategy for the West’, addressing both American and European needs.99
Conclusions
In May 1982, Schmidt confided in a letter to the former British prime minister James
Callaghan how he was ‘painfully aware of the restraints and vulnerabilities which beset
German policy, knowing by experience that most of what we can do depends in the last
resort on a well-functioning European Community and Atlantic Alliance’.100 As we
have seen, this basic insight into West Germany’s exposed role in Cold War Europe
formed the cornerstone of Schmidt’s political thought, something that can be traced
from the late 1940s right up to the last days of his chancellorship. Schmidt never
turned from an ‘Atlanticist’ into a ‘Europeanist’, but always regarded the two as equal
and mutually reinforcing pillars of his foreign policy. Already in the late 1940s,
Schmidt had realised that European integration was indispensable for mastering the
growing economic interdependencies in post-war Europe, appreciating the advantages
the EC promised to each member-state. In this regard, he supported European
integration not to overcome the nation-state, but to overcome the antagonisms
between nation-states at an age of unprecedented interdependence; beliefs that can be
found in his earliest writings on the Ruhrstatut right up to his quest for the
harmonisation of European economies in the 1970s and subsequent creation of the
EMS. In this sense, Schmidt can be seen as a convinced ‘Milwardian’ Europeanist,
embracing economic integration primarily for the concrete and tangible advantages it
promised.
Yet Schmidt’s conceptions of Europe had always stretched beyond the economic
sphere. For him, European integration was an indispensable vehicle for the promotion
of German interests, having realised early on how the EC managed to contain the
FRG’s foreign policy safely and permanently in a multilateral framework. Just like
Adenauer in the 1950s or Brandt in the 1960s, Schmidt was fully aware that, because of
Germany’s history as well as its exposed geopolitical position, any successful foreign
policy always had to be embedded in a concerted multilateral effort. This is evident not
only in Schmidt’s role in Ostpolitik after 1969, but also in his drive to revitalise the EC
as part of a coordinated Western response to the challenges of the 1970s, which found
its institutional expression in the creation of the European Council. While his desire
for common European action would become more visible during the transatlantic rifts
of the late 1970s, this was an element that had always existed in Schmidt’s politics. Far
from being agnostic or half-hearted towards Europe, he had consciously sought to
utilise and reform the European Community from the very beginning of his
chancellorship. This vision of a strong Europe as key part of a wider transatlantic
99H. Schmidt, A Grand Strategy for the West: The Anachronism of National Strategies in an
Interdependent World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 3.
100 B136/17494, Schmidt to Callaghan, 13 May 1982.
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community remained constant throughout his political life, though external
circumstances sometimes led to different public perceptions, in particular during
the years of the Carter administration. Yet it was not that Schmidt’s political
convictions had changed at that point; rather, the international and domestic
preconditions on which he had previously built his two-pillar foreign policy were
beginning to evaporate.
Taking a wider perspective, then, Schmidt’s story also forces us to reconsider the
popular but misleading dichotomy of ‘Atlanticism’ and ‘Europeanism’ in Cold War
Europe. For Schmidt, European integration was never designed to undermine
American leadership of the Western world; yet he nonetheless regarded a strong and
functioning EC as indispensable for both West Germany and the wider Atlantic
alliance. Just like Adenauer or Brandt during much of their time in office, Schmidt
remained convinced that the provisional Federal Republic could only thrive with both
French and American support. Rather than trying to define ‘Europeanism’ against
‘Atlanticism’ or vice versa, it may be more fruitful to historicise such notions as part
of contemporary political debate at the time, and to focus instead on the many
relations and interconnections between the two interlinked processes of European and
transatlantic cooperation. This applies in particular to studies of West Germany, the
country at the heart of both European integration and the Cold War. Indeed, with a
political career spanning from the late 1940s to 1987, Schmidt’s journey may be seen to
illustrate the particular evolution and character of the Federal Republic during the
Cold War, a divided and provisional country caught between ‘self-restraint’ and ‘self-
assertion’, like few others.101
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